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A B S T R A C T
This paper identiﬁes a new source that explains environmental behaviour: the presence of future
tense marking in language. We predict that languages that grammatically mark the future aﬀect
speakers’ intertemporal preferences and thereby reduce their willingness to address environ-
mental problems. We ﬁrst show that speakers of languages with future tense marking are less
likely to adopt environmentally responsible behaviours and to support policies to prevent en-
vironmental damage. We then document that this eﬀect holds across countries: future tense
marking is an important determinant of climate change policies and global environmental co-
operation. The results suggest that there may be deep and surprising obstacles for attempts to
address climate change.
1. Introduction
This paper provides a novel explanation for diﬀerences in environmental behaviour within and across countries: future tense
marking in language. Language is important for economic outcomes for two reasons. First, language may serve as a marker of
underlying cultural factors. It has been shown that future tense is associated with speakers’ long-term orientation (Galor et al., 2016);
long-term orientation in turn is relevant for a range of economic outcomes. Second, language may have a direct eﬀect on cognition and
behaviour. This eﬀect has been documented in a nascent, but rapidly growing economics literature on the link between linguistic
structures and economic outcomes (see Mavisakalyan and Weber, 2017 for a review). Part of this literature builds on the so-called
Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis to propose that the structure of our language aﬀects our thinking and behaviour.
Speakers of languages that lack future tense marking speak about future events in the present tense, i.e. as if they were present. In
contrast, languages with future tense marking require speakers to use a distinct form when talking about the future. This linguistic
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diﬀerence seems to aﬀect speakers’ intertemporal preferences and induces less future-oriented behaviour (Chen, 2013).3 Consistent
with this hypothesis, recent studies have shown that speakers of languages with future tense marking save less and invest less in their
health (Chen, 2013; Guin, 2015). At the corporate level, the existing evidence suggests that ﬁrms in locations with future tense
marking have lower precautionary cash holdings (Chen et al., 2015) and invest less in research and development (Su et al., 2016).
That intertemporal preferences potentially mediate the eﬀects of grammatical future tense has been shown experimentally through
elicited time preference data by Sutter et al. (2015). Our study contributes to this literature by extending the eﬀects of future tense
marking to a new and highly signiﬁcant area of future oriented-behaviour: environmental action.
The literature has studied several determinants of individual environmental action, highlighting the role of both economic factors
and norms (Inglehart, 1995; Gelissen, 2007; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Bechtel et al., 2016). Existing studies on policies concerning
climate change and other environmental problems focus mainly on countries’ economic (Damania et al., 2003; Damania and
Fredriksson, 2003), institutional (Congleton, 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013), historical (Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2015;
Ang and Fredriksson, 2017) and demographic (Tonn et al., 2001; Kahn, 2002) traits. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the
ﬁrst to combine the analysis of the determinants of environmental actions and policies with the study of linguistic structures in
economics, and to identify future time reference in language as a signiﬁcant source of variation in environmental action within and
across countries.
We use individual-level data from the World Values Surveys to demonstrate that individual speakers of languages with obligatory
future tense marking are less likely to adopt environmentally responsible behaviours compared to observationally identical in-
dividuals who speak languages that do not grammatically distinguish between present and future. Moreover, we show that they are
also less likely to support policies to prevent environmental damage. We complement the individual-level analysis with an analysis of
environmental policy outcomes across countries. The results of this analysis are consistent with those obtained in individual-level
comparisons: countries similar in their economic, demographic and institutional characteristics, yet diﬀerent in their grammatical
structure have diﬀerent climate change policies and global environmental cooperation outcomes. Policies are less stringent in places
where the majority language requires future tense marking.
We ﬁrst provide some background on the connection between culture, language and behaviour and propose mechanisms which
mediate the eﬀect of language on climate change action (Section 2). In Section 3 we describe the data used in the study, followed by a
discussion of empirical approaches in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results, including various robustness checks. We conclude with
a discussion of the implications of our ﬁndings in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Language, culture and behaviour
The relationship between language, culture, and behaviour is complex. First, many features of language are determined by
culture. Culture, in the form of inherited beliefs and values, has in turn important eﬀects on behaviour. Viewed in this way, linguistic
structures serve as indicators of cultural variables. Second, there is good evidence that language also has a direct inﬂuence on
cognition and behaviour—the way we speak seems to aﬀect the way we think and act. Finally, there are reciprocal connections
between language and culture: language may support the inﬂuence and preservation of culture by aiding its propagation and giving it
a lasting form; language may further shape culture, as it is the main medium of its transmission (Mavisakalyan and Weber, 2017).
The idea that there’s a direct inﬂuence of language on cognition and behaviour is at the heart of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis
(LRH). In a nutshell, the LRH states that the structure of one’s language has a systematic inﬂuence on cognition and behaviour.4
Diﬀerent languages represent the world in diﬀerent ways by emphasising diﬀerent aspects of reality. As a result, speakers of a certain
language may be more sensitive to various features of the world. For example, Russian has diﬀerent basic colour terms than English: it
has one basic term for light blue and another one for dark blue, but none corresponding to the generic “blue”. It thus forces its
speakers to distinguish light from dark blue. Experiments show that Russian speakers are better at perceptually discriminating
diﬀerent shades of blue as a consequence (Winawer et al., 2007). For decades, linguists and cognitive scientists have regarded the
LRH as misguided. However, starting in the early 1990s, the theory has received a revival, and there is now a substantial and ever-
growing body of literature that testiﬁes to its validity (e.g. Levinson, 1996; Boroditsky et al., 2003; Slobin, 2003; Kay and Regier,
2006; Levinson and Wilkins, 2006).
3 The literature has additionally considered the eﬀects of two other linguistic features. Linguistic gender systems have been linked with gender inequalities in various
contexts including the labour market (Mavisakalyan, 2015; Gay et al., 2017), corporate and political leadership (Santacreu-Vasut et al., 2014; Hicks et al., 2016),
household division of labour (Hicks et al., 2015), education (Davis and Reynolds, 2016) and health (Bhalotra et al., 2015). Grammatical rules governing personal
pronouns (pronoun drop and politeness distinctions) have been linked to various cultural traits across countries, including individualism vs collectivism, social
distance, etc. (Kashima and Kashima, 1998; Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016). Furthermore, studies have exploited these grammatical features to study the causal
relationship between culture and various socio-economic outcomes (Licht et al., 2007; Tabellini, 2008; Davis and Williamson, 2016).
4 For an overview on the LRH see Gumperz and Levinson (1996); Lucy (1997); Casasanto (2015). There are diﬀerent interpretations of the LRH (Scholz et al., 2016).
A strong interpretation assumes a strong eﬀect of language on thought: language determines thought; i.e. no thought (of a certain type) without corresponding linguistic
structures. A moderate interpretation assumes only a moderate eﬀect of language on thought: language inﬂuences thought in systematic and non-trivial ways. The
existing evidence on the LRH supports moderate readings of the LRH better than strong ones. Here, we are only assuming a moderate interpretation.
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2.2. Future tense, long-term orientation, and temporal displacement
Tense marking is a linguistic feature that seems to aﬀect economic outcomes (Chen, 2013). In particular, the way a language
organises reference to the future seems to have consequences for a number of future-directed actions, such as saving, exercising,
abstaining from smoking, condom use, retirement savings, and long-run health (Chen, 2013). In some languages, e.g. French and
English, speakers are required to use a dedicated form when talking about future events. In other languages, e.g. German and Finnish,
speakers can talk about the future in the same grammatical form in which they talk about the present.5
English: Tomorrow they willauxiliary drive to Paris.
French: Demain ils conduiront à Paris — (Tomorrow they drivefuture to Paris).
German: Morgen fahren sie nach Paris — (Tomorrow they drivepresent to Paris).
We follow the terminology and classiﬁcation of Chen (2013) in referring to languages which require a dedicated marking of the
future as strong-FTR languages (e.g. English, French) and to languages that do not require to grammatically mark the future as weak-
FTR languages (e.g. German, Finnish).6 The grammatical diﬀerence between strong- and weak-FTR is associated with agents’ in-
tertemporal preferences and decision making. Our study suggests that this inﬂuence includes environmental behaviour.
According to the above, there are two ways to understand the inﬂuence of future tense on speakers’ intertemporal preferences and
behaviour (both are consistent with our ﬁndings). Future tense may be a marker for cultural factors, or future tense may directly
aﬀect speakers’ cognition and behaviour (or both). Both the cultural and the linguistic–cognitive channel of inﬂuence rely on the
phenomenon of temporal discounting. Humans (and other animals) have a well-established tendency to discount future costs and
rewards (Ramsey, 1928; Solnick et al., 1980; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Frederick et al., 2002). The further in the future an outcome
seems, the more we discount its potential costs or beneﬁts.
The mechanism associated with the cultural channel may proceed via speakers’ orientation towards the future. Absence of grammatical
future tense in a language seems to indicate increased long-term orientation among its speakers (Galor et al., 2016). Increased long-term
orientation can be represented by its eﬀect on agents’ discount rates. Diﬀerent agents diﬀer in how strongly the eﬀect of temporal dis-
counting is manifested, as measured by diﬀerent discount rates. We can thus understand the eﬀect of long-term orientation as a reduction
in agents’ discount rates. Speakers of strong-FTR language have higher discount rates compared to speakers of weak-FTR languages.
The mechanism associated with the linguistic–cognitive channel combines temporal discounting with temporal displacement. The
idea behind temporal displacement is that using a dedicated grammatical form to talk about future events subjectively projects these
events further away from the speaker’s now—they appear temporally more distant to the agent. The separate grammatical form
represents the future as discontinuous with the present. Conversely, speaking about the future in the present tense depicts it as
continuous with the present and subjectively locates future outcomes closer to the agent’s current temporal perspective. The eﬀect of
temporal displacement then combines with that of temporal discounting. In tandem, temporal displacement and temporal dis-
counting aﬀect agents’ intertemporal preference structure such that future options appear less rewarding and less costly to speakers of
a strong-FTR languages, compared to speakers of weak-FTR languages, since they appear temporally more distant, and are thus more
strongly aﬀected by temporal discounting.7
To illustrate, imagine two agents Aweak and Bstrong. The only salient diﬀerence between Aweak and Bstrong is that Aweak is a speaker of
a weak-FTR language, presenting the future as if it were present and indicating high long-term orientation, whereas Bstrong is a speaker
of a strong FTR language, projecting the future away from the present and marking low long-term orientation. Assume that Aweak is
indiﬀerent between a present reward x1 and an intrinsically more rewarding future option x2: (x1, tnow) = (x2, tlater). When Bstrong is
presented with the same choice, s/he may well prefer the less rewarding present option. There are two potential explanations. First,
the presence of future tense may indicate that B’s long-term orientation is low, and thus her discount rate is high: δA < δB. Second,
assuming that temporal displacement is operative, the later option appears comparatively more distant and therefore less attractive
(even assuming identical discount rates). Again, it is possible that both mechanism are jointly operative. Both mechanisms inﬂuence
B’s intertemporal preference structure such that: (x1, tnow) > (x2, tlater).
2.3. Intertemporal preferences and environmental action
Pro-environmental actions and policies typically incur present costs for the sake of future rewards. For instance, green products
are on average more expensive than conventional products. Buying a green product thus has signiﬁcant short-term costs, but the
expected reward, i.e. avoiding damaging environmental outcomes, is located relatively far in the future. The pay-oﬀ structure of such
decisions thus makes them amenable to the above described inﬂuence of temporal displacement and discounting. Speakers of weak-
FTR languages are expected to value the future beneﬁts of pro-environmental actions and policies higher than speakers of strong FTR
languages. Given their diﬀerent preferences, speakers of weak-FTR languages are expected to engage in more pro-environmental
5 It is true that German, like English, also has the potential to explicitly mark reference to the future, e.g. with the auxiliary “werden”. It is therefore important to
stress that the diﬀerence between the two groups of languages concerns whether future time reference “is overtly and obligatorily marked” (Dahl, 2000, p. 310, our
emphasis).
6 Chen’s (2013) classiﬁcation is based on that of the European Science Foundation’s Typology of Languages in Europe (EUROTYP) project (Dahl, 2000), which
undertook a very comprehensive study of the tense and aspect system of the major European languages.
7 It is also conceivable that future tense has a direct eﬀect on speakers’ discount rates; in that case the cultural and the linguistic–cognitive channel work in
equivalent ways. The mechanism proposed here is very similar to one of several proposed in Chen (2013, p. 695).
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behaviour than speakers of strong-FTR language. This is indeed what our study ﬁnds.
Furthermore, in a standard median voter model, which assumes the presence of electoral motives, political decisions reﬂect the
preferences of the electorate (Downs, 1957). Hence, given the diﬀerent intertemporal preferences of individual voters, we expect to
see better environmental policy and cooperation outcomes in places with weak-FTR languages. The same result is predicted if we
alternatively assume a ‘citizen candidates’ model. Politicians who speak weak-FTR languages have either higher long-term or-
ientation and a correspondingly reduced temporal discount rate or a general tendency to perceive future concerns as more pressing
(or a combination of both). As a result, they have stronger pro-environmental preferences and are more likely to implement policies
consistent with those preferences once elected (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Both scenarios are consistent
with our ﬁndings; distinguishing between them is beyond the scope of our paper.
3. Data
Most of the empirical evidence on the determinants of environmental policies are based on large country-level datasets (e.g.,
Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013; Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2015; Ang and Fredriksson, 2017). Cross-
country data provide a general picture, but they may conceal important behavioural mechanisms underlying aggregate outcomes.
Yet, not all questions are amenable to sub-national analysis; understanding the drivers of climate change policies is particularly
diﬃcult using micro-level data. With these considerations in mind, the paper combines an individual-level analysis that employs
survey data from a large sample of countries to compare pro-environmental behaviours of individuals with aggregate-level data to
perform cross-country comparisons of climate change policies.
3.1. Measurement of FTR
Our classiﬁcation of languages into those which require a dedicated marking of the future, strong-FTR languages, and those that do
not, weak-FTR languages, is based on data from Chen (2013). Chen’s classiﬁcation rests on whether a language requires an obligatory
FTR in ‘prediction-based contexts’ adopted from the European Science Foundation’s Typology of Languages in Europe (EUROTYP)
project (Dahl, 2000). To justify this criterion, Dahl (2000) notes that “whether FTR is overtly and obligatorily marked in prediction-
based sentences can be used as one of the major criteria for whether it is grammaticalized in language or not” (Dahl, 2000, p. 310).
The data itself comes from EUROTYP and, in the case of non-European languages, other established cross-linguistic analyses (e.g.,
Dahl and Dienes, 1984; Dahl, 1985; Bybee et al., 1994; Nurse, 2008; Cyﬀer et al., 2009) (see Appendix B in Chen (2013) for further
discussion on the coding of languages). Chen (2013) further substantiates the validity of this measure using frequency analysis of
future-marking in weather forecast texts retrieved from the web.8
3.2. Individual-level data
The data source for individual-level analysis of pro-environmental behaviour is the World Values Surveys, a collection of na-
tionally representative, individual-level surveys conducted in nearly 100 countries (almost 90 percent of the world’s population)
containing rich information on a variety of attitudes and preferences, as well as standard socio-economic and demographic char-
acteristics of individuals. Six waves of the survey, with the latest covering the years 2010–2014, have been conducted since its
inception in 1981–1984. Cross-country comparability, representativeness, richness and relevance of the data make WVS highly
appropriate for the purposes of individual-level analysis in this study.9
The language FTR measure is linked to the language spoken at home by the individual. This information has been collected since
wave 3 conducted in years 1995–1998. The FTR of the language spoken by individuals is connected to their pro-environmental
behaviour, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION, as captured by aﬃrmative responses to a question on whether in the preceding 12 months, ‘out of
concern for the environment’, they have chosen household products that they think are better for the environment. Capturing
individuals’ willingness to incur short-term costs for the sake of future rewards, this measure is highly appropriate for understanding
individual support for climate change policies adopted at national level. This question was asked in wave 3 of WVS conducted in
years 1995–1998. The study therefore is restricted to this wave. As a second dependent variable, we utilise information on the
respondents’ support to increase taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental damage and their willingness to buy things
at 20% higher than usual prices to construct a binary measure of their WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POLICIES.
Following Chen (2013), our analysis excludes ﬁrst-generation immigrants to isolate the eﬀect of diﬀerences in language from
native-immigrant diﬀerences. We drop observations with missing outcome data, arriving at a baseline sample of 34,461 individuals in
35 countries.10
8 The sample of languages from this analysis is too small to be useful for the current study.
9 An alternative approach to individual-level analysis of the eﬀect of language structures on economic outcomes of individuals is to study the behaviour of
immigrants (e.g., Hicks et al., 2015; Gay et al., 2017) within a single immigrant-hosting country, applying an ‘epidemiological approach’ (see e.g. Gay et al., 2016 for a
discussion). We were not able to identify a data source that would contain appropriate information on pro-environmental behaviours and languages spoken by
individuals to allow for such study.
10 The countries in the sample include: Albania, Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Georgia, Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics for all variables used in the baseline analysis by language FTR. Eighty-
seven percent of individuals in the sample speak a strong FTR language. The incidence of ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION is 62% among speakers
of weak FTR languages and 41% among speakers of strong FTR languages suggesting a negative eﬀect of STRONG FTR on pro-en-
vironmental action.
The individual-level analysis controls for standard observable demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals
included in similar studies (e.g., Gelissen, 2007; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Bechtel et al., 2016). The demographic controls include
gender, age and family circumstances. Forty-eight percent of individuals in the sample are male—a gender that has been linked to
unecological attitudes (Blocker and Eckberg, 1997; Gelissen, 2007). We control for age, to account for associated diﬀerences in
environmental preferences. As Farzin and Bond (2006) argue, young people may have larger stakes in environmental quality, and
therefore may have stronger demand for stringent environmental policies. On the other hand, older people may feel the en-
vironmentally induced health problems more directly, and thus may be more willing to extend support for such policies. Inter-
generational environmental altruism and greater access to time and resources to support environmental initiatives may further
contribute to higher demand for environmental policies by older people (Farzin and Bond, 2006). Intergenerational altruism is also
more likely to be observed among those with families and children—additional characteristics of individuals we control for. The
average age in the sample is around 41 years old; sixty-ﬁve percent of individuals are married and only 26% of all individuals have no
children.
Furthermore, we account for standard socio-economic characteristics of individuals. These include educational attainment
Table 1
Individual-level descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean
(s.d.)
WEAK FTR STRONG FTR All
STRONG FTR 0 1 0.869
(0.338)
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 0.617 0.411 0.438
(0.486) (0.492) (0.496)
MALE 0.500 0.477 0.480
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
AGE 40.840 40.990 40.970
(14.920) (15.980) (15.850)
MARRIED 0.721 0.643 0.653
(0.448) (0.479) (0.476)
NO CHILDREN 0.252 0.260 0.259
(0.434) (0.439) (0.438)
PRIMARY 0.286 0.196 0.208
(0.452) (0.397) (0.406)
SECONDARY 0.284 0.307 0.304
(0.451) (0.461) (0.460)
TERTIARY 0.430 0.497 0.488
(0.495) (0.500) (0.500)
EMPLOYED 0.692 0.514 0.537
(0.462) (0.500) (0.499)
INCOME DECILE 1 0.077 0.127 0.121
(0.268) (0.333) (0.326)
INCOME DECILE 2 0.105 0.174 0.165
(0.307) (0.379) (0.371)
INCOME DECILE 3 0.136 0.151 0.149
(0.343) (0.358) (0.356)
INCOME DECILE 4 0.149 0.129 0.132
(0.356) (0.335) (0.338)
INCOME DECILE 5 0.169 0.114 0.121
(0.375) (0.317) (0.326)
INCOME DECILE 6 0.123 0.084 0.089
(0.329) (0.278) (0.285)
INCOME DECILE 7 0.094 0.074 0.077
(0.292) (0.262) (0.267)
INCOME DECILE 8 0.063 0.062 0.062
(0.243) (0.240) (0.241)
INCOME DECILE 9 0.038 0.046 0.045
(0.190) (0.209) (0.207)
INCOME DECILE 10 0.046 0.038 0.039
(0.208) (0.192) (0.194)
N 4528 29,933 34,461
Note.— Standard deviations in parentheses. Variables are deﬁned in section 3.2. Source: World Values Survey Wave 3 (1995–1998). The
sample is restricted to non-immigrants. Thirty-ﬁve countries listed in footnote 10 are included.
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expected to be positively correlated with pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Gelissen, 2007; Franzen and Meyer, 2010). Primary and
secondary school attainment comprise 21% and 30% of the sample, with the remaining 49% having tertiary education. We further
control for individuals’ employment status (54% prevalence in the sample) and income, captured in deciles, both expected to result in
increased propensity for environmental action (e.g., Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Bechtel et al., 2016).
We complement the individual-level analysis of pro-environmental behaviour with a cross-country analysis of environmental
policies. The data used in this analysis are described next.
3.3. Country-level data
The cross-country analysis is based on data from multiple sources, including Steves et al. (2011); Keefer (2012); Chen (2013);
Marshall et al. (2016); World Bank (2016). Together, they result in a sample of 68 countries in the baseline speciﬁcation.11 Table 2
speciﬁes the sources and presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the baseline cross-country analysis by weak- and
strong-FTR language groups. Following other studies (e.g., Licht et al., 2007; Santacreu-Vasut et al., 2013; Bhalotra et al., 2015), the
FTR marker is assigned to a country’s most widely spoken language (based on information collected by Alesina et al., 2003).12 76% of
the countries in our baseline sample speak a strong-FTR language, while the remaining 24% are weak-FTR countries.
We analyse the relationship between the FTR system of a country’s majority language and its climate change policies as captured
by Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI) developed by Steves et al. (2011) and used in several published studies
(e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013; 2016). CLIMI measures countries’ climate change mitigation policies with reference to the
2005–2010 annual national communications to the UNFCCC. CLIMI uses 12 components, grouped into four key policy areas, with
sub-weights and weights reﬂecting the contribution of each of the components/areas to climate change mitigation: (i) International
cooperation (0.1) [components: Kyoto ratiﬁcation (0.5), Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism host (0.5)]; (ii)
domestic climate framework (0.4) [components: cross-sectoral climate change legislation (0.33), carbon emissions target (0.33),
dedicated climate change institution (0.33)]; (iii) signiﬁcant sectoral ﬁscal or regulatory measures or targets (0.4) [components:
energy supplies/renewables (0.3), transport (0.13), buildings (0.07), agriculture (0.13), forestry (0.17), industry (0.2)]; and (iv)
additional cross-sectoral ﬁscal or regulatory measures (0.1) [components: cross-sectoral policy measures (1)]. CLIMI ranges from 0
and 1, with higher values representing stricter policies.
As a second dependent variable, we use a measure of a country’s participation in global collaborative environmental eﬀorts,
GLOBAL, that comes from Esty et al. (2005) and has been used in several studies on the subject (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013;
2016). This measure combines information on a country’s number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental organiza-
tions, its contribution to international and bilateral funding of environmental projects and development aid, and its participation in
international environmental agreements. GLOBAL ranges from -1.69 to 1.74 (see Esty et al., 2005 for details).
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the baseline analysis. The average CLIMI score in the entire
sample is 0.412.13 In the sample of countries with a weak-FTR majority language it is 0.517, while in the sample of countries with a
strong-FTR language it is 0.380. This gap of 0.137 points suggests a negative eﬀect of STRONG FTR on CLIMI.
Our analysis of the link between language FTR and climate change policies controls for a range of observable characteristics of
countries that have been accounted for in previous studies on determinants of environmental policies. Since CLIMI is derived from
information collected over the period 2005–2010, we use explanatory variables averaged over this time period.
Four groups of covariates are included in the baseline models. The ﬁrst included economic characteristics. We expect the demand
for environmental quality to increase with GDP PER CAPITA (measured in log) (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013; 2016). Following
these studies, we also control for OPENNESS, deﬁned as imports plus exports divided by GDP. On the one hand, more open countries may
cooperate more on environmental problems (Neumayer, 2002). On the other hand, it is possible that the interests of exporting
countries are threatened by environmental agreements. Under such a scenario, higher openness for trade may decrease the will-
ingness to commit to stringent environmental policies. The sectoral structure of an economy may also inﬂuence the stringency of its
environmental policies. We include manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP, MANUFACTURING %, to account for this pos-
sibility. According to Cole et al. (2006) and Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009), this measure may capture the lobbying pressures
from workers in the manufacturing sector for lower regulations. Alternatively, it may measure the degree to which an economy
consists of pollution-intensive manufacturing, positively aﬀecting the regulatory stringency.
The second group of covariates encompasses demographic characteristics of countries. We control for the size of the country, as
captured by the log of its population size, POPULATION SIZE (e.g., Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2014). Additionally, we control for the
share of immigrants in the total population, IMMIGRANT % (averaging at 8.2% in the sample) as a measure of ethnic diversity. Previous
research has highlighted the diﬃculty in agreeing on public goods and policies in diverse societies (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997;
Alesina et al., 1999). Accounting for ethnic diversity is particularly important in the present context, given our interest in isolating the
11 The countries in the sample include: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar,
Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
12 To reﬂect the heterogeneity in multilingual countries, a weighted measure with weights given by the share of the population speaking each language is used in
robustness checks (e.g., Tabellini, 2008; Mavisakalyan, 2015).
13 Saudi Arabia has the lowest CLIMI score in the sample at 0.023, while the UK has the highest score at 0.801.
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eﬀect of language from other confounders; including the immigrant share of the population therefore seems appropriate. Further-
more, the share of the population of 65 or more years of age, POPULATION AGE 65+ % (averaging at 11.1% in the sample) is included as
an additional demographic control for reasons discussed above. In particular, it has been suggested that intergenerational en-
vironmental altruism, linked with older age, may contribute to pro-environmental behaviour (Farzin and Bond, 2006).
The third group of covariates comprises measures for institutions. We control for countries’ political regime based on polity score
measure available from the Polity IV data set (Marshall et al., 2016). The polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-
point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy), and is converted into two regime categories to
distinguish between democracies (+6 to +10), 71% in the sample, and other regime types (Marshall et al., 2016). A strand of
literature shows that democracies are more conducive to enactment of environmental regulations compared to autocracies (e.g.,
Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006). As an additional control, we include an indicator for LEFT GOVERNMENT, with its
prevalence being 27.9% in the sample, based on information on the political orientation of the national leader’s party available from
Keefer (2012).14 An implication that follows from a number of studies is that left-wing parties are more pro-environmental than their
right-wing counterparts (e.g., Neumayer, 2003; 2004).
Finally, dummies for continents are included throughout the analysis. Forty-seven percent of the countries in the sample are based
on the European continent, followed by 21% country representation from Asia. Africa and South America contribute each 10.3% of
the countries in the sample, while North American countries comprise 7%. The smallest share of countries in the sample, 4.4%, is in
Oceania.
Table 2
Cross-country descriptive statistics.
Variables Source Mean
(s.d.)
WEAK FTR STRONG FTR All
STRONG FTR Chen (2013) 0 1 0.765
(0.427)
CLIMI Steves et al. (2011) 0.517 0.380 0.412
(0.253) (0.205) (0.223)
GDP PER CAPITA World Bank (2016) 9.968 9.619 9.701
(1.109) (0.854) (0.923)
OPENNESS World Bank (2016) 0.943 0.842 0.865
(0.312) (0.439) (0.413)
MANUFACTURING % World Bank (2016) 16.048 15.651 15.744
(6.157) (5.050) (5.285)
POPULATION SIZE World Bank (2016) 15.857 16.534 16.375
(1.761) (1.561) (1.623)
IMMIGRANT % World Bank (2016) 8.647 8.048 8.189
(7.143) (10.167) (9.496)
POPULATION AGE 65+ % World Bank (2016) 12.793 10.594 11.111
(6.524) (5.112) (5.505)
DEMOCRACY Marshall et al. (2016) 0.750 0.692 0.706
(0.447) (0.466) (0.459)
OTHER REGIME Marshall et al. (2016) 0.250 0.308 0.294
(0.447) (0.466) (0.459)
LEFT GOVERNMENT Keefer (2012) 0.375 0.250 0.279
(0.500) (0.437) (0.452)
CONTINENT AFRICA World Bank (2016) 0.125 0.096 0.103
(0.342) (0.298) (0.306)
CONTINENT ASIA World Bank (2016) 0.188 0.212 0.206
(0.403) (0.412) (0.407)
CONTINENT EUROPE World Bank (2016) 0.625 0.423 0.471
(0.500) (0.499) (0.503)
CONTINENT NORTH AMERICA World Bank (2016) 0.000 0.096 0.074
(0.000) (0.298) (0.263)
CONTINENT OCEANIA World Bank (2016) 0.063 0.038 0.044
(0.250) (0.194) (0.207)
CONTINENT SOUTH AMERICA World Bank (2016) 0.000 0.135 0.103
(0.000) (0.345) (0.306)
N 16 52 68
Note.— Standard deviations in parentheses. Variables are deﬁned in section 3.3. The countries in the sample are listed in footnote 11.
14 According to the source for this data, the parties have been classiﬁed as left if their names reveal them to be communist, socialist, or social democratic or if the
sources label them as left-wing (Beck et al., 2001).
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4. Empirical approach
Our empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. We start with an analysis of individual-level determinants of pro-environmental
behaviour. We then complement the individual-level analysis with an analysis of environmental policies across countries and es-
tablish a baseline eﬀect of language FTR on policies across countries. We extend this analysis, by including additional variables that
could be correlated with hitherto unexplained parts of climate change policies. Clearly, this approach cannot fully account for all
confounding inﬂuences. We therefore adopt two strategies to directly address the problem of endogeneity. First, we use an instru-
mental variable, a source of exogenous variation in language FTR, and estimate a 2SLS model. Second, we also assess the extent of
bias following the partial identiﬁcation approach proposed by Oster (2016). The description of these steps follows.
4.1. Individual-level model
To establish the eﬀect of STRONG FTR at the individual level, we estimate variants of a model of propensity for ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION,
EA*jl for an individual j in country l of the following form:
= + + = ⋯ = ⋯EA K γ ζStrongFTR ω j M l P* forall 1, , ; 1, ,jl jl jl jl (1)
where StrongFTRjl is the indicator of a strong FTR language, Kjl is a vector of controls for gender, age, family status, education,
employment and income characteristics and ωjl is a disturbance term. Observed environmental action EAjl is assumed to relate to
latent propensity through the criterion = ≥EA EA1( * 0),jl jl which under an assumption of normality for ωjl gives rise to the standard
probit model of the form:
= = +Pr EA K StrongFTR K γ ζStrongFTR( 1 , ) Φ( )jl jl jl jl jl (2)
with marginal eﬀects of STRONG FTR derived from the estimated model thus:
∂ =
∂
= +
Pr EA K StrongFTR
StrongFTR
ζϕ K γ ζStrongFTR
( 1 , )
( )jl jl jl
jl
jl jl
(3)
Marginal eﬀects such as those described in (3) can be evaluated either at the sample means or for speciﬁed values of each explanatory
variable.
The identical model is estimated for WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POLICIES as dependent variable.
4.2. Cross-country model
To establish the baseline relationship between language FTR and climate change policy of country i, we estimate variants of the
following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
= + + = ⋯CLIMI X α βStrongFTR i Nɛ forall 1, ,i i i i (4)
where StrongFTRi is an indicator of strong-FTR language spoken in the country, Xi is a vector of controls for economic, demographic,
institutional and geographic characteristics of countries deﬁned in Section 3.3, and εi is a disturbance term.
Estimating the eﬀect of language FTR on climate change policies requires that it is exogenously determined and uncorrelated with
the error term in (4). However, this is unlikely to hold due to unobserved heterogeneity: both linguistic features and environmental
policy outcomes may be the product of deeper, unobserved factors.15
Existing attempts to isolate the eﬀect of linguistic measures on various economic outcomes have taken into account the historical
and geographic relatedness of languages (e.g., Chen et al., 2015; Mavisakalyan, 2015; Roberts et al., 2015). We follow these ap-
proaches as a ﬁrst step to mitigate the inﬂuence of unobserved heterogeneity, and include proxies for such relatedness. We se-
quentially introduce these proxies into the estimations of Eq. (4). The aim is to reveal the extent to which the estimated eﬀect of
STRONG FTR on CLIMI captures the correlation between STRONG FTR and these variables that have been omitted from Eq. (4), by comparing
the estimated parameters from baseline and comprehensive speciﬁcations.
Despite our eﬀorts to control for relevant observable variables, we cannot rule out that some omitted variable is correlated with
both STRONG FTR and CLIMI. A conventional approach to deal with this possibility is to use an instrumental variable. Galor et al. (2016)
argue that pre-industrial geographical features that resulted in high returns to agricultural investments are at the root of cross-
language variations in the presence of future tense. Building on this observation, we use CROP YIELD (pre-1500CE), sourced from
Galor and Özak (2016), as an instrument for STRONG FTR and estimate Eq. (4) using 2SLS where STRONG FTR is treated as endogenous and
modeled as:
= + + = ⋯StrongFTR τX ψCropYield ι i Nforall 1, ,i i i i (5)
To evaluate how concerned we should be about omitted variables, we also exploit an approach proposed by Oster (2016), which
15 We largely exclude the possibility of reverse causality. Tabellini (2008) points out: ‘As a classic example of network externalities, language evolves slowly over
time. Linguistic innovations are costly because until they are widely adopted communications is more diﬃcult.’ (p. 273). In support of this, Roberts et al. (2015) show
that future-time reference variable, in particular, is very stable over time.
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builds on the work of Altonji et al. (2005) to use the amount of selection on the observables as a guide to the amount of selection on
the unobservables. To that end, we evaluate the bias-adjusted coeﬃcient derived by Oster (2016):
≈ − − −
−
∼
∼β β δ β β
R R
R R
* [ ˙ ] ˙
͠ ͠ max
(6)
where β˙ and R˙ are the coeﬃcient and R-squared from a parsimonious model including STRONG FTR but no other controls, and β͠ and ∼R
are the coeﬃcient and R-squared from a regression with STRONG FTR and a set of other controls. δ denotes the relative importance of
observable relative to unobservable variables in generating bias while Rmax is the R-squared from a hypothetical regression of CLIMI on
all observable and unobservable variables.
Since δ and Rmax are not known, Oster (2016) proposes a bounding approach: the estimated eﬀect of STRONG FTR should range from
β͠ to β* estimated under an assumption of =δ 1, i.e. observables and unobservables have the same explanatory power in CLIMI, and
given values of ∈ ∼R R[ , 1]max . We take two approaches to specifying plausible values for Rmax . First, we assume =R 0.90max which is
sensible for a cross sectional sample that potentially has considerable noise in the outcome variable. Second, we follow Oster (2016)
in setting = ∼R min R{1.3 , 1}max .16 Estimated coeﬃcients can be considered as robust, if the identiﬁed set β β[ , *]͠ excludes zero. Fur-
thermore, following Oster (2016), we calculate the value of δ that would be needed to explain away the entire causal eﬀect of STRONG
FTR on CLIMI. Values of δ>1 suggest that the results are robust, i.e. the unobservables would have to be more important than the
observables in explaining CLIMI.
5. Results
5.1. Individual-level results
First, we explore the consequences of speaking a STRONG FTR language at the individual level. We estimate probit models of the
eﬀect of STRONG FTR on the probability of taking an ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION given in Eq. (2). We present the results of this analysis in
Table 3. For ease of interpretation the marginal eﬀects, such as those described in Eq. (3), are reported.
Starting with a parsimonious speciﬁcation reported in column (1), we estimate a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of STRONG FTR language
spoken at home by an individual on the probability of acting pro-environmentally. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics
reported in Table 1. In column (2) we control for standard demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals. We estimate
a negative signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect on STRONG FTR, although its magnitude is smaller. Additionally, we ﬁnd that males are less likely to
act pro-environmentally; this is in line with other studies (e.g., Blocker and Eckberg, 1997; Gelissen, 2007). Conversely, age is positively
correlated with the probability of taking ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION. We ﬁnd that the probability of acting pro-environmentally is higher for
individuals who don’t have children, potentially due to additional ﬁnancial constraints faced by these individuals, although this result is
not robust to inclusion of additional controls in subsequent models. Socio-economic characteristics are important determinants of
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION. In particular, similar to others (e.g., Gelissen, 2007; Franzen and Meyer, 2010), we ﬁnd a positive link between
educational attainment and the probability of acting pro-environmentally. In column (3) we repeat this regression and also include
dummies for countries in the sample. The estimated marginal eﬀect on STRONG FTR, while of considerably smaller magnitude, remains
signiﬁcant. Moving from a WEAK FTR to a STRONG FTR language leads to an 8.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of taking an
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION (this implies that the ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION is 20% lower). This is a sizeable eﬀect. It is larger, for example, than that
of moving from tertiary to secondary level of education, or from male to female gender identity.
In columns (4)–(6) we expand the list of control variables in an eﬀort to mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias in the
estimates of STRONG FTR. First, we control for TRUST, a dummy that takes 1 if the respondent believes that most people can be trusted and
0 otherwise. This is a potentially important determinant of individuals’ willingness to engage in action in support of a collective need.
Indeed, we estimate a positive signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect on TRUST. However, the estimate on STRONG FTR is largely unaﬀected by the
inclusion of this variable (column (4)). In column (5) we report the results of the regression that includes two further controls. The
ﬁrst is a dummy for LEFT VIEWS, calculated based on the individual’s self-positioning on a political scale. The second is IDEALIST, a dummy
that takes 1 if the respondent has the view that less emphasis on money and material possessions in the future would be a good thing
and 0 otherwise. As expected, we ﬁnd that both LEFT VIEWS and IDEALIST are positively correlated with the probability of taking an
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION; the estimated negative marginal eﬀect on STRONG FTR remains signiﬁcant. The next group of additional predictors
for ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION includes three variables. We control for individuals who are OPTIMIST, deﬁned as a dummy to indicate the belief
that humanity has a bright future and 0 otherwise. In addition, we include a dummy for HIGH LOCUS OF CONTROL, characterised by an
individual’s assessment of the degree of free choice and control over their life. Our last variable is a dummy for EXISTENTIALIST, for those
who often or sometimes think about meaning and purpose of life in contrast to those who do so rarely or never. We estimate strong
positive marginal eﬀects on HIGH LOCUS OF CONTROL and EXISTENTIALIST. The marginal eﬀect on OPTIMIST, however, is indistinguishable from
0. This regression also conﬁrms the negative signiﬁcant eﬀect of STRONG FTR on the probability of acting pro-environmentally. In the
ﬁnal column, we introduce controls for the nine language families covering the languages in the sample. Roberts et al. (2015)
highlight the signiﬁcance of controlling for language families in studying the economic eﬀects of linguistic structures. The estimate on
STRONG FTR remains robust to the inclusion of these controls.
16 Oster (2016) tests the robustness of treatment parameters from randomized control studies published in reputable economics journals from 2008–2013 and ﬁnds
that using = ∼R R1.3max reproduces 90% of randomized results.
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Next, we ask whether STRONG FTR also aﬀects preference for pro-environmental policies by estimating a version of Eq. (2) where
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POLICIES is used as the dependent variable instead. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. Indeed, the
negative signiﬁcant eﬀect of STRONG FTR extends to individuals’ pro-environmental policy preferences. Estimation results from the most
extensive speciﬁcation reported in column (7) suggest marginal eﬀects of 10.1 percentage points. This implies that the WILLINGNESS TO
PAY FOR POLICIES is 24% lower for speakers of STRONG FTR languages. This is an economically highly signiﬁcant eﬀect.
The estimated marginal eﬀects on other variables are broadly similar to those obtained from the regressions of ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION with one notable exception: while we established a positive signiﬁcant correlation between the respondent’s age and their
probability of taking an ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION, the relationship between age and WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POLICIES is negative. As discussed
earlier, young people may have larger stakes in environmental quality, and therefore may have stronger demand for pro-environ-
mental policies (Farzin and Bond, 2006). At the same time, older people may feel the environmentally induced health problems more
directly, and thus may be more willing to take an ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION; they may also have greater access to time and resources to
support environmental initiatives (Farzin and Bond, 2006).
Overall, the ﬁndings so far suggest that languages with STRONG FTR lead their speakers to act less pro-environmentally and to extend
lower support for pro-environmental policies. In discussing the potential mechanisms of STRONG FTR above, we mentioned two pos-
sibilities: a cultural channel and a linguistic-cognitive channel. To explore the extent to which language is simply serving as a marker
for the cultural trait of long term orientation, we control for such proxy generated based on the responses to questions on the degree
to which thrift and savings money is an important value to teach children.
Including this measure has no eﬀect on our estimates of STRONG FTR.17 This result is very similar to that obtained by Chen (2013),
who found that the language future tense eﬀects (in the context of savings behaviour) operate through a channel which is entirely
independent of cultural attitudes as captured through the same proxy we use here. There are two ways to interpret this result: either
our results support a scenario where FTR operates through the linguistic-cognitive channel; or the proxy we use to capture the
respondents’ long-term orientation is far from perfect in the context of our study. Strictly distinguishing across various channels
underlying our results is a largely infeasible task given the constraints around empirical design and data.
Table 3
Individual regressions with baseline and additional controls — Probit marginal eﬀects.
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
STRONG FTR −0.206** −0.197** −0.089*** −0.086*** −0.083** −0.082** −0.139***
(0.0927) (0.089) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030)
MALE −0.086*** −0.074*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.074*** −0.074***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
AGE 0.005* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MARRIED 0.008 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NO CHILDREN 0.036*** 0.016** 0.014* 0.014* 0.005 0.004
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
PRIMARY −0.118** −0.140*** −0.141*** −0.140*** −0.134*** −0.128***
(0.046) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
SECONDARY −0.040 −0.059*** −0.058*** −0.057*** −0.052*** −0.050***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
EMPLOYED 0.079 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TRUST 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
LEFT VIEWS 0.027** 0.027** 0.031***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
IDEALIST 0.022* 0.021* 0.018*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
OPTIMIST 0.000 0.005
(0.012) (0.010)
HIGH LOCUS OF CONTROL 0.049*** 0.047***
(0.013) (0.012)
EXISTENTIALIST 0.093*** 0.092***
(0.009) (0.009)
Income deciles No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families No No No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.046 0.178 0.177 0.178 0.180 0.183
N 34,461 34,461 34,461 33,087 33,087 33,087 33,083
Note.— Dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION. *Denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
17 We also directly regressed the cultural trait of long term orientation on STRONG FTR and other controls. We obtained insigniﬁcant estimates on STRONG FTR
throughout. The results of these analyses are available on request.
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5.2. Cross-country results
5.2.1. Baseline results
We established that support for pro-environmental policies is less prevalent among the individuals speakers of STRONG FTR lan-
guages. Do we then observe less stringent environmental policies in places where STRONG FTR language are spoken? This could happen
either because the political decisions reﬂect the preferences of the electorate (Downs, 1957) or if politicians who speak strong-FTR
languages have weaker pro-environmental preferences and implement policies consistent with those preferences (Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) or both. The rest of the paper is dedicated to exploring the link between language FTR and
environmental policies across countries.
The OLS estimates of the eﬀect of STRONG FTR on our baseline measure of climate change policies, CLIMI, based on Eq. (4) are
presented in Table 5. The speciﬁcation reported in column (1) excludes other controls. Consistent with the descriptive statistics
reported in Table 2, the estimates identify a negative relationship between STRONG FTR and CLIMI.
Next, we examine the relationship between STRONG FTR and CLIMI, controlling for economic characteristics of countries (column (2)).
The magnitude of the eﬀect of STRONG FTR is smaller, but preserves its signiﬁcance. As expected, GDP PER CAPITA is positively correlated
with CLIMI. Conversely, OPENNESS is negatively correlated with CLIMI, possibly reﬂecting the lack of willingness to commit to stringent
environmental policies by exporting countries whose interests may be threatened by such policies. This variable, however, loses its
signiﬁcance once other characteristics of countries are controlled for in columns (3)–(6). Meanwhile, we estimate a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient on MANUFACTURING %, a variable that potentially captures the pollution-intensity of economies.
We further control for demographic characteristics of countries. The results reported in column (3) demonstrate that the sig-
niﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient on STRONG FTR is robust to inclusion of these controls, although its magnitude is smaller. In the
spirit of previous ﬁndings on the link between ethnic diversity and public policies (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al.,
1999), we show that the share of a country’s immigrant population is negatively related to the stringency of its climate change
policies. This potentially reﬂects the diﬃculties in agreeing on public policies in diverse communities. This eﬀect does not persist,
however, once additional controls are included in estimations reported in columns (4)–(6). We also ﬁnd that the share of a country’s
elderly population, deﬁned as those aged 65 and above, is positively correlated to the stringency of climate change policies although
this eﬀect is not robust to controlling for continents in column (5).
In column (4), we control for institutional characteristics of countries. The estimated coeﬃcient on STRONG FTR is hardly aﬀected.
Table 4
Individual regressions with baseline and additional controls using an alternative dependent variable — Probit marginal eﬀects.
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
STRONG FTR −0.093** −0.094** −0.097* −0.097* −0.094* −0.067* −0.101*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061)
MALE −0.020*** −0.027*** −0.025*** −0.025*** −0.018** −0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
AGE −0.002 −0.003*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MARRIED 0.028*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014* 0.014*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
NO CHILDREN 0.022*** 0.020** 0.017** 0.017** 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
PRIMARY −0.048* −0.083*** −0.082*** −0.081*** −0.066*** −0.066***
(0.029) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
SECONDARY −0.033* −0.024** −0.021** −0.020** −0.011 −0.011
(0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
EMPLOYED −0.022 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TRUST 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.028** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
LEFT VIEWS 0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
IDEALIST 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
OPTIMIST 0.023** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.010)
HIGH LOCUS OF CONTROL 0.039*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.010)
EXISTENTIALIST 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.015) (0.015)
Income deciles No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families No No No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.009 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.049 0.050
N 38,449 38,449 38,449 38,449 37,047 30,851 30,847
Note.— Dependent variable is WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POLICIES. *Denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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We ﬁnd that the stringency of climate change policies is higher in democracies, consistent with other ﬁndings in the literature (e.g.,
Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006). The estimated coeﬃcient on LEFT GOVERNMENT, while positive, is insigniﬁcant.
Finally, in column (5) we control for economic, demographic and institutional characteristics of countries, and also include
dummies for continents. The signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of STRONG FTR on CLIMI persists: we estimate that CLIMI is 0.06 points lower in
countries with a STRONG FTR, relative to a WEAK FTR majority language. This is equivalent to a 15% decrease in CLIMI, implying, for
example, that if Greece were to switch from a strong- to a weak-FTR language, the stringency of their climate change policies would
be at the level of those observed in Sweden (our estimates are reasonably precise relative to the diﬀerence in actual stringency of
climate change policies between the two countries).
In column (6), we evaluate the sensitivity of this ﬁnding to the potential presence of inﬂuential observations calculated based on
DFbetas for STRONG FTR from baseline regression in column (5). We drop those observations for which > NDFbeta 2/ (Belsley et al.,
1980). The estimated coeﬃcient on STRONG FTR is more signiﬁcant in this sample, both in statistical and economic terms.
5.2.2. Robustness checks
We have established a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between STRONG FTR and CLIMI. An important question is whether
language simply acts as a marker of unobserved characteristics, or whether language itself has a direct causal eﬀect
(Mavisakalyan and Weber, 2017). In Table 6, we explore this issue by including several additional controls (to allow for comparisons,
column (1) repeats the estimate from baseline speciﬁcation in column (5) of Table 5).
First, we run a placebo regression with a diﬀerent linguistic feature which is irrelevant to the outcome of our study, as an
additional control (e.g., Mavisakalyan, 2015). The feature we control for is LANGUAGE GENDER, a measure of grammatical gender in-
tensity in a language that comes from Gay et al. (2017) (the study provides the details on how this measure is constructed). Re-
assuringly, the results presented in column (2) show that this linguistic feature is unrelated to CLIMI, while the estimated signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on STRONG FTR persists.
Existing attempts to isolate the economic eﬀect of linguistic measures have considered the relevance of historic origins of
countries. These may potentially confound the estimated eﬀect of STRONG FTR, as they may inﬂuence linguistic and cultural evolution,
while also being relevant for policy outcomes either through aﬀecting these directly or through other channels. To mitigate the eﬀect
of associated bias, we introduce controls for the nine language families covering the languages in the sample. The estimate on STRONG
FTR is robust to the inclusion of these controls (which in turn are jointly signiﬁcant) (column 3).
Another possibility to consider is that linguistic features of countries are spatially correlated, i.e. that there is a concentration of
linguistic features in certain areas. The estimated eﬀect on STRONG FTR may then be due to correlated geographic and climatic factors.
To address this concern, our baseline list of controls includes continent ﬁxed eﬀects. In column (4) we additionally control for
countries’ LANDLOCKED status, their LATITUDE and the total rents they derive from natural resources as a share of GDP—features that have
been linked to countries’ economic development (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999); they have also been used in previous attempts to isolate
Table 5
Baseline cross-country regressions — OLS coeﬃcients.
Control variables All All All All All No outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STRONG FTR −0.146** −0.095** −0.078** −0.081** −0.061* −0.097***
(0.068) (0.038) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035)
GDP PER CAPITA 0.133*** 0.109*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.068**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
OPENNESS −0.086* −0.057 −0.005 −0.045 -0.046
(0.043) (0.059) (0.058) (0.070) (0.066)
MANUFACTURING % 0.012*** 0.009** 0.006* 0.008** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POPULATION SIZE 0.003 0.003 −0.001 0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
IMMIGRANT % −0.005** −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
POPULATION AGE 65+ % 0.013*** 0.009** 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
DEMOCRACY 0.182*** 0.210*** 0.218***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.052)
LEFT GOVERNMENT 0.004 0.020 0.014
(0.044) (0.048) (0.049)
Constant 0.517*** −0.917*** −0.837** −0.633* −0.575 −0.413
(0.062) (0.218) (0.384) (0.375) (0.395) (0.382)
Continents No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.075 0.530 0.643 0.724 0.749 0.755
N 70 68 68 68 68 64
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. Columns (1)-(5) report the results based on the full sample. Column (6) reports the results in a sample where outliers are removed;
these are identiﬁed by predicting DFbetas for STRONG FTR from the full sample regression and then dropping those observations for which > NDFbeta 2/ . Columns (5)
and (6) include continent dummies. *Denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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the eﬀect of linguistic measures on various outcomes (e.g., Mavisakalyan, 2015). Our estimates on LANDLOCKED and LATITUDE are in-
signiﬁcant, while RESOURCES RENTS % is negatively signiﬁcantly correlated with CLIMI. The signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of STRONG FTR is
robust to this addition to the list of controls.
Finally, we control for the institutional relatedness of countries in the sample by introducing controls for the origins of their legal
systems. These have been included in other attempts to mitigate the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity in studying the eﬀect of
linguistic measures on economic outcomes (e.g., Chen et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest
that they might aﬀect climate change policies (Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2015). Most sources distinguish between two main
secular legal traditions: common law and civil law, and several subtraditions—French, German, Socialist, and Scandinavian—within
civil law (Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2008). French civil law and common law are the most common internationally, and
dummies for these legal systems are included in the regressions reported in column (5). The estimated coeﬃcients on these dummies
are insigniﬁcant, while the eﬀect of STRONG FTR is signiﬁcant and sizeable.18
As another robustness check of the cross-country results we explore whether the results are sensitive to how STRONG FTR is assigned.
In the baseline models, STRONG FTR is assigned to a country’s majority language. This potentially conceals the diﬀerences across
linguistically distinct groups in diverse societies. To address this issue, we introduce a reﬁnement: we replace the STRONG FTR dummy
with a continuous variable, STRONG FTR %, measuring the total population share speaking a STRONG FTR language. Data on FTR for some
of the minority languages is missing. Similar to the approach in Mavisakalyan (2015), we restrict the sample to countries where
information on language FTR is available for at least 80% of the population, and additionally control for the share of the population
with unknown language FTR.
The results are reported in Table 7. For ease of comparisons, column (1) reports the results with our baseline measure of STRONG FTR
(this corresponds to the estimates from the model with the comprehensive list of controls presented in column (5) of Table 6). The
results of the regression of CLIMI on our alternative measure of language FTR and comprehensive list of controls are presented in
column (2). The estimated coeﬃcient on STRONG FTR % is negative and signiﬁcant, albeit small in magnitude, while that on UNKNOWN FTR
% is insigniﬁcant.
5.2.3. Addressing endogeneity
The above shows that the eﬀect of STRONG FTR persists, even when proxies for unobserved heterogeneity are included. Still, un-
observed heterogeneity can never be completely excluded. The standard approach to address the problem of omitted variable bias is
to use an instrumental variable. This is what we pursue here: building on the ﬁndings by Galor et al. (2016); Galor and Özak (2016),
we exploit CROP YEILD as an instrument for STRONG FTR in estimating its eﬀect on CLIMI.
The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 8. To allow for comparisons, the corresponding OLS estimates are reported in
columns (1) and (3) (these are identical to those reported in column (5) of Table 5 and column (5) of Table 6). The estimates from the
Table 6
Cross-country regressions with additional controls— OLS coeﬃcients.
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRONG FTR −0.061* −0.076** −0.091* −0.096** −0.113**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045) (0.056)
LANGUAGE GENDER 0.022 0.033 0.036 0.031
(0.014) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
LANDLOCKED −0.007 0.007
(0.051) (0.060)
LATITUDE −0.017 −0.004
(0.196) (0.217)
RESOURCES RENTS % −0.005*** −0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
COMMON LAW 0.052
(0.118)
FRENCH CIVIL LAW 0.060
(0.064)
Constant −0.575 −0.654 −0.684 −0.408 −0.360
(0.395) (0.417) (0.419) (0.400) (0.511)
Language families No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.749 0.760 0.813 0.846 0.851
N 68 68 65 64 64
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. *Denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
18 Davis and Williamson (2016) propose an Interdependent Institutions Hypothesis, according to which there is an interaction between formal and informal institutions
and the eﬀect of culture (i.e. informal institutions) may depend on the formal institutional context. Certain legal and political frameworks are more permeable for
cultural inﬂuences, or may even amplify these, e.g. “democracy and the common law tradition magnify the [cultural] inﬂuence of individualism” (Davis and
Williamson, 2016, p. 1056). We explored whether this possibility holds in our context by including interaction terms of STRONG FTR and DEMOCRACY and STRONG FTR and
legal origin dummies in estimations. These were insigniﬁcant throughout.
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Table 7
Cross-country regressions using an alternative independent variable — OLS coeﬃcients.
Control variables (1) (2)
STRONG FTR −0.113**
(0.056)
STRONG FTR % −0.001*
(0.001)
UNKNOWN FTR % 0.006
(0.004)
Constant −0.360 −0.303
(0.511) (0.669)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes
R2 0.851 0.853
N 64 58
Note.—Dependent variable is CLIMI. STRONG FTR % is the share of population speaking a STRONG FTR
language. UNKNOWN FTR % is the share of population speaking a language with missing FTR data. The
regression in column (2) is restricted to countries with UNKNOWN FTR % ≤ 20. *Denotes signiﬁcance at
10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
Table 8
Cross-country 2SLS regressions.
Control variables OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STRONG FTR −0.061* −0.188* −0.113** −0.244***
(0.033) (0.108) (0.056) (0.088)
GDP PER CAPITA 0.087*** 0.069** 0.119*** 0.087**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.042) (0.036)
OPENNESS −0.045 −0.030 −0.028 −0.058
(0.070) (0.059) (0.078) (0.062)
MANUFACTURING % 0.008** 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
POPULATION SIZE −0.001 0.010 −0.013 −0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017)
IMMIGRANT % −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
POPULATION AGE 65+ % 0.003 0.003 −0.005 −0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
DEMOCRACY 0.210*** 0.199*** 0.233*** 0.223***
(0.053) (0.048) (0.055) (0.041)
LEFT GOVERNMENT 0.020 0.006 0.037 0.021
(0.048) (0.047) (0.062) (0.048)
LANGUAGE GENDER 0.031 0.032
(0.026) (0.021)
LANDLOCKED 0.007 0.014
(0.060) (0.050)
LATITUDE −0.004 −0.051
(0.217) (0.155)
RESOURCES RENTS % −0.004** −0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
COMMON LAW 0.052 0.151
(0.118) (0.098)
FRENCH CIVIL LAW 0.060 0.097*
(0.064) (0.050)
Constant −0.575 −0.512 −0.360 −0.249
(0.395) (0.344) (0.511) (0.394)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language families No No Yes Yes
R2 0.749 0.699 0.851 0.830
N 68 68 64 64
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F statistics † 9.53 10.02
Note.— Dependent variable is CLIMI. *Denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels. † The Ho is that the ﬁrst stage regression is weakly
identiﬁed.
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2nd stage of the 2SLS models with baseline as well as with comprehensive lists of controls conﬁrm the negative signiﬁcant eﬀect of
STRONG FTR. Moreover, the magnitudes of the estimated eﬀects are larger. In defence of our identiﬁcation strategy, the statistics for the
weak identiﬁcation test (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 F statistics) provides no evidence that the instrument we use is weak or irre-
levant.
As an additional approach to address the potential problem of endogeneity of STRONG FTR, we apply the partial identiﬁcation
approach proposed by Oster (2016). The results of this test are presented in Table 9.
In columns (2) and (4) we report the coeﬃcient bounds β β[ , *]͠ for models with baseline and comprehensive lists of controls
(reported in column (5) of Table 5 and column (5) of Table 6 respectively). The ﬁrst bound β͠ comes from the speciﬁcations con-
trolling for all baseline/comprehensive observables. The second bound β* is evaluated using Eq. (6) by setting =δ 1 and applying two
assumptions on the value of Rmax . First, we assume =R 0.90max . i.e. that the measurement error in CLIMI accounts for 10% of the
variation therein (column (2)). Second, we apply the rule of thumb proposed by Oster (2016) in setting Rmax equal to the minimum of
one or to the R-squared from the regression controlling for all observables multiplied by a factor of 1.3 (column (4)). Furthermore, in
columns (1) and (3) we report the corresponding estimates of δ that would be needed to explain away the entire causal eﬀect of STRONG
FTR on CLIMI.
None of the estimated bounds include 0. This suggests that at least part of the estimated eﬀect on STRONG FTR is likely to be causal.
Moreover, in all cases δ>1, i.e. the unobservables would have to be more important than the observables in explaining CLIMI. This
provides further assurance that the results are robust to omitted variables.
5.2.4. Implications for international environmental cooperation
Our baseline dependent variable, CLIMI, measures climate change mitigation policies adopted by countries in four key policy areas
including (i) international cooperation; (ii) domestic climate framework; (iii) signiﬁcant sectoral ﬁscal or regulatory measures or
targets; and (iv) additional cross-sectoral ﬁscal or regulatory measures (Steves et al., 2011). While we have established that STRONG FTR
aﬀects CLIMI, so far the analysis does not tell us whether and to what extent this eﬀect applies to individual policy areas.
Here we focus on the link between STRONG FTR and global environmental cooperation, as captured by GLOBAL, given its particularly
signiﬁcant role in climate change mitigation eﬀorts. Moreover, future tense might inﬂuence international cooperation through an
additional channel.19
Avoiding global warming and maintaining atmospheric temperatures at current levels is a public good. As is well-known, public
goods lead to social dilemmas. Individual actors have an interest both in the goods production and in avoiding the costs of its
production. As public goods are non-excludable, narrow self-interest dictates to free-ride. If most defect from shouldering the burden
of the goods production, it won’t be produced and everyone is worse oﬀ. Applied to our case, every nation has an interest in both
maintaining current temperature levels and also in avoiding the costs of doing so; but if most nations act in their narrow self-interest,
catastrophic climate change seems inevitable.
Empirically, the actual rate of cooperation in such situations is much higher than a game-theoretic model based on narrow self-
interest predicts. There are several psychological factors which increase actors’ willingness to cooperate. The two most important
ones are social value orientation (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999) and trust (Dawes, 1980; Yamagishi, 2011).
However, there is an additional factor which has recently received attention: orientation towards the future: “A [...] trait relevant to
cooperation in social dilemmas is the consideration of future consequences (CFC), deﬁned as ‘the extent to which people consider the
potential distant outcomes of their current behaviours and the extent to which they are inﬂuenced by these potential outcomes’
(Strathman et al., 1994; Joireman et al., 2012, p. 743).” (Van Lange et al., 2014, p. 64); see also (Parks, 2015). Further, theoretical
models suggest that in repeated prisoner dilemma games (i.e. situations that reﬂect the incentive structure of public goods dilemmas),
anticipatory strategies that predict the future rate of other players’ cooperative behaviour are more successful and realistic than
strategies based on subjective utility calculations and backward looking learning mechanisms (Lalev and Grinberg, 2006). So, both
empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that future orientation increases cooperation.
As the absence of future tense is associated with increased future orientation, we expect that countries with weak-FTR languages,
and thus higher orientation towards the future, should be more willing to cooperate on climate change and adopt policy measure that
are conducive to combating climate change, even if these policies hurt their short-term interest. This is indeed what we ﬁnd. In the
parsimonious speciﬁcation reported in column (1) of Table 10 we report a highly signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on STRONG FTR. This
Table 9
Test of omitted variable bias - Cross-country results.
Speciﬁcation =δRmax 0.90 ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦= =β β, *
͠
R δ( max 0.90, 1)
= ∼δR min Rmax {1.3 ,1} ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦= =
∼β β, *͠ R min R δ( max {1.3 ,1}, 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BASELINE CONTROL 2.689 − −[ 0.060, 0.040] 1.728 − −[ 0.060, 0.027]
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROLS 3.119 − −[ 0.112, 2.106] 1.300 − −[ 0.111, 1.674]
Note.— δ indicates the value of proportional selection of unobservables to observables assuming the maximum value of theoretical R2 is Rmax . The coeﬃcient bounds
are calculated assuming the unobservables are as important as the observables in explaining the outcome variable (i.e. =δ 1).
19 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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result is remarkably robust to including the entire list of baseline controls in column (2). We also address the endogeneity of STRONG FTR
using CROP YEILD as an instrument. Column (3) reports the results of the second stage regression where the estimated coeﬃcient on
STRONG FTR remains robust and signiﬁcant. Applying the partial identiﬁcation approach proposed by Oster (2016) yields similar results:
we ﬁnd δ>1, i.e. the unobservables would have to be more important than the observables in explaining GLOBAL.
6. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings support the idea that future tense marking in language aﬀects speakers’ future-oriented behaviour. The evidence
presented here indicates that this eﬀect includes pro-environmental action: at the individual level, speakers of weak-FTR languages
are more willing to engage in costly pro-environmental actions and to support pro-environmental policies; at the country level,
nations with weak-FTR language, i.e. that speak about the future as it were present, have more stringent environmental policies.
We have proposed that there are two possible channels for this inﬂuence: a cultural channel via speakers’ long-term orientation or
a linguistic–cognitive channel via speakers’ perception of temporal distance. Both aﬀect agents’ intertemporal preference structure
such that weak-FTR speakers discount future costs and rewards less than do strong-FTR speakers. Individuals that speak about the
future in the present tense care more about it. There is reason to believe that future tense marking does indeed causally inﬂuence pro-
environmental behaviour and policies. First, we show that the eﬀect persists after controlling for geographic and historical relat-
edness of languages. Second, applying full and partial identiﬁcation approaches also yields support for a causal eﬀect.
Our results have potential implications for policy making. They show that pro-environmental governments or lobby groups face
particular obstacles in countries with strong-FTR languages. It seems unrealistic to expect countries to engage in linguistic reforms
with the aim of turning strong-FTR languages into weak-FTR ones, at least in the short term. But there are other possible con-
sequences. One may, for instance, conclude that environmental campaigns in strong-FTR countries should especially aim to coun-
terbalance the eﬀect of FTR and portray the risks of climate change as real and urgent. Further, international organisations may
decide that investing in environmental projects in weak-FTR countries (that are otherwise equal) has a better payoﬀ, as their citizens
will be more receptive for environmental concerns.
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